I’ve taught courses on the politics and law of international trade (graduate) and understanding the role of economists / economics in public policy (undergraduate).

Syllabi and teaching reviews available upon request.

Below is an illustrative outline of two courses I’ve led or co-led.


Syllabus for Thinking Economically: The Economics Behind Economic Policy (2019)


Economics has become the most influential social science discipline in policymaking, with economists permeating public policy discourse. Your semester in Washington is designed to give you an introduction to the ways of the Capitol and the Capital. As such, a vital part of your training – and the goal of this class – will be to become an informed consumer and translator of economic arguments. This entails understanding economic terms and definitions, the models and tools used by economists, when and how the government might intervene in the market, and what the economics are behind economic policies. Most weeks are organized around a key economics-related legislation or initiative, which we use as an entry point into understanding and comparing three different political economy perspectives: libertarianism, liberalism, and structuralism.

Core Readings

Ha-Joon Chang, Economics: The User’s Guide (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2014).

Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Second Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001). This edition has useful intros.

Week 1 (Sept. 3): Macroeconomics and economic measurement
In this class, we’ll look at macroeconomics: the study of the economy as a whole. What components make up the economy, and how do they relate to one another?
– Chang, Chapters 1 and 6.
– Eshe Nelson and Dan Kopf, “Economic Models Are Broken, and Economists Have Wildly Different Ideas about How to Fix Them,” Quartz (blog), September 14, 2017, https://qz.com/1077549/economic-models-are-broken-and-economists-like-joseph-stiglitz-and-researchers-at-the-bank-of-england-have-wildly-different-ideas-about-how-to-fix-them/.
– Austin Clemons and Heather Boushey, “Disaggregating Growth,” Washington Center for Equitable Growth, March 28, 2018 https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/disaggregating-growth/?longform=true
– Additional reading:
o Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya K. Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, “The Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress Revisited: Reflections and Overview,” 2009, https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01069384/. Introduction

Week 2 (Sept. 10): Three Economic Perspectives: Libertarianism, Liberalism, and Structuralism
Policy-making is all about what the state should do or not do. This week, we will look at three major intellectual frameworks informing why policymakers “intervene” (or do not intervene) in markets. These include libertarianism, liberalism, and structuralism – perspectives we will return to for the rest of the semester. Ideas associated with each of these perspectives include, respectively: perfect markets, market failure, and fictitious commodities.
– Chang, Chapter 4.
– Polanyi, Chapters 4-6, 12.
– Additional reading:
o Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Chapter 1.

Week 3 (Sept. 17): Economic Development: From Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures to the Washington Consensus
What is economic development? What role do institutions like the market and state play? What role do the major sectors of the economy (agriculture, manufacturing, and services) play?
– Chang, Chapters 2, 3, and 7.
– Johan Norberg, In Defence of Global Capitalism (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2008), http://www.africanliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/GLOBAL%20CAPITALISM.pdf. Chapter 2.
– Additional reading:
o Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2012). Chapter 2
o Alexander Hamilton, “Report on the Subject of Manufactures” (Philadelphia: U.S. Treasury Department, December 5, 1791), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-10-02-0001-0007.
o Todd N. Tucker, “Industrial Policy and Planning: What It Is and How to Do It Better” (New York: Roosevelt Institute, July 30, 2019), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/industrial-policy-and-planning/.
o Dieter Plehwe, “The Origins of the Neoliberal Economic Development Discourse,” in The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, ed. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 238–79.

Week 4 (Sept. 24): Trade: From GATT to Trump
Trade policy has skyrocketed to relevance with the Trump administration’s escalation of trade conflicts. What are the major issues in U.S. trade policy? How do political and economic arguments intersect?
– Chang, Chapter 12.
– Polanyi, Chapters 15, 17, and 20.
– N. Gregory Mankiw, “Economists Actually Agree on This: The Wisdom of Free Trade,” The New York Times, April 24, 2015, sec. The Upshot, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/upshot/economists-actually-agree-on-this-point-the-wisdom-of-free-trade.html.
– Additional reading:
o Marco Rubio, “Made in China 2025 and the Future of American Industry” (Washington, DC: US Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, February 12, 2019), https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d1c6db46-1a68-481a-b96e-356c8100f1b7/3EDECA923DB439A8E884C6229A4C6003.02.12.19-final-sbc-project-mic2025-report.pdf.
o Ana Swanson, “A Simple Explanation of Why Trump Is Wrong on Trade, According to a Top Expert,” Washington Post, February 17, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/02/17/a-simple-explanation-of-why-trump-is-wrong-on-trade-according-to-a-top-expert/?utm_term=.42467add419e. [Interview with David Autor]

Week 5 (Oct. 1): Out of Work, Out of Luck?
What labor market and social policies support work or non-work? How do assumptions about how people share income within families underlie these policies? Today’s readings provide an overview of work, unemployment, and the the role of the state in the labor market and a foundation for the next few classes.
– Chang, Chapter 10
– Heather Boushey, Finding Time: The Economics of Work-Life Conflict, Harvard University Press, 2016, Chapter 2
– Additional reading:
o Isabelle Sawhill, The Forgotten Americans: An Economic Agenda for a Divided Nation, Yale University Press, 2018, Chapters 7 and 9

Week 6 (Oct. 8): A Fair Day’s Wage(?)
Today, we turn to how people make a living in a market economy. What determines how much someone is paid? How low can pay go and can government set a floor?
– Polanyi, Chapter 7
– Teresa Ghilarducci and Aida Farmand, “What’s Not to Like About the EITC? Plenty, It Turns Out,” The American Prospect, June 28, 2019, https://prospect.org/article/whats-not-about-eitc-plenty-it-turns-out
– Additional reading:
o John Schmitt, “Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Employment?” https://www.takeactionminnesota.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Why-Does-the-Minimum-Wage-Have-No-Discernible-Effect-on-Employment.pdf
o David Neumark, “The Effects of Minimum Wages on Employment,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Newsletter, December 21, 2015. https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2015-37.pdf

Week 7 (Oct. 15): Inequality and the Tax and Jobs Act of 2017
Is inequality an inevitable outcome in a market economy? Is it a desirable outcome? How does fiscal policy affect inequality?
– Chang, Chapter 9
– Austin Clemons, “New data reveal how U.S. economic growth is divided,” Washington Center for Equitable Growth, July 1, 2019. https://equitablegrowth.org/new-data-reveal-how-u-s-economic-growth-is-divided/
– White House and Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President, February 2018, Chapter 1, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ERP_2018_Final-FINAL.pdf
– Heather Boushey & Greg Leiserson, “Worsening Inequality,” The American Prospect, June 28, 2018, https://prospect.org/article/worsening-inequality
– Additional reading:
o Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 1 (2003): 1–41. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=

Week 8 (Oct. 22): Finance and Money
What are the functions of money, banks, stock markets, and other financial institutions in crisis and in normal times?
– Chang, Chapter 8.
– Polanyi, Chapters 1, 2, and 16.
– Sarwat Jahan and Chris Papageorgiou, “What Is Monetarism?,” Finance & Development 51, no. 1 (March 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2014/03/basics.htm.
– John Lanchester, “The Invention of Money,” The New Yorker, July 29, 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/08/05/the-invention-of-money.
– Additional reading:
o Binyamin Appelbaum, “The Case Against the Bernanke-Obama Financial Rescue”. The New York Times, May 16, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/business/the-case-against-the-bernanke-obama-financial-rescue.html

Week 9 (Oct. 31): Monopoly and Anti-Trust
How do markets work when there is little or no competition among sellers? Is this even the right way to think about the problem?
– Rob van Horn, “Reinventing Monopoly and the Role of Corporations: The Roots of Chicago Law and Economics,” in The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, ed. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 204–37.
– Anwar Shaikh, Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises, 1 edition (Oxford University Press, 2016)., Chapter 6 – focus on the table near the end.
– Robert D. Atkinson and Michael Lind, “Is Big Business Really That Bad?,” The Atlantic, March 7, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/04/learning-to-love-big-business/554096/.
– Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles, “Opinion | Republicans Can’t Even Cut Red Tape Correctly,” The New York Times, May 18, 2018, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/opinion/trump-deregulation-republicans.html.
– Additional Reading:
o Brink Lindsey, “Low-Hanging Fruit Guarded by Dragons: Reforming Regressive Regulation to Boost U.S. Economic Growth,” White Paper (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, June 22, 2015), https://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/low-hanging-fruit-guarded-dragons-reforming-regressive-regulation-boost-us.
o Lina M. Khan, “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,” Yale Law Journal 126, no. 3 (2017): 710–805.
o Mushtaq H. Khan and Kwame Sundaram Jomo, Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Chapter 1

Week 10 (Nov. 5): Crises: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
In week 5, we talked about jobs. This week, we put jobs crises in a macroeconomic context. We’ll explore how the three perspectives interrelate in their takes on what the state should do.
– The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “Chart Book: The Legacy of the Great Recession,” https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/chart-book-the-legacy-of-the-great-recession
– Garrett Jones and Veronique de Rugy, “Will the Stimulus Bill Crowd Out Good Economics?” The Mercatus Center, September 2009, https://www.mercatus.org/publication/will-stimulus-bill-crowd-out-good-economics#cit8
– Dylan Matthews, “2 economists imagined a financial crisis without stimulus or bailouts. It’s … ugly.” https://www.vox.com/2015/10/20/9571349/blinder-zandi-stimulus-bailout
– Additional reading:
o Gary Burtless, “ Long Term Unemployment: Anatomy of the Scourge”
o N. Gregory Mankiw, “Crisis Economics,” National Affairs, Summer 2010, https://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/crisis-economics

Week 11 (Nov. 12): Climate and Environmental Economics
How do economists approach the problem of climate change and environmental damage?
– Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, “H.Res.109 – Recognizing the Duty of the Federal Government to Create a Green New Deal.” (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/109/text.
– Jerry Taylor, “The Conservative Case for a Carbon Tax” (Washington, DC: Niskanen Center, March 23, 2015), https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/The-Conservative-Case-for-a-Carbon-Tax1.pdf.
– Greg Carlock and Emily Mangan, “A Green New Deal: A Progressive Vision for Environmental Sustainability and Economic Stability” (Washington, DC: Data for Progress, September 2018), http://filesforprogress.org/pdfs/Green_New_Deal.pdf.
– Leslie Hook, “Surge in US Economists’ Support for Carbon Tax to Tackle Emissions,” Financial Times, February 17, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/fa0815fe-3299-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5.
– Additional readings:
o Robert Pollin et al., “Green Growth: A U.S. Program for Controlling Climate Change and Expanding Job Opportunities” (Amherst: University of Massachusetts-Amherst, September 2014), http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Green_Growth_2014/GreenGrowthReport-PERI-Sept2014.pdf.

Week 12 (Nov. 19): In-Class Presentations

Week 13 (Nov. 26): Thankgiving, No Class.

Week 14 (Dec. 3): Economics and the Individual: From Gary Becker to Cass Sunstein and the “Nudge Unit”
How do economists conceive of the individual and how does this affect policy design? How do assumptions about human behavior underlie policy? We will review rational choice and behavioral approaches.
– Chang, Chapter 11.
– Brigitte C Madrian, “Applying Insights from Behavioral Economics to Policy Design,” Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2014), https://doi.org/10.3386/w20318.
– Buster Benson, “Cognitive Bias Cheat Sheet,” Medium (blog), October 11, 2019, https://medium.com/better-humans/cognitive-bias-cheat-sheet-55a472476b18.
– Mahmoud Bahrani, “The Economics of Crime with Gary Becker,” Chicago Maroon, May 25, 2012, https://www.chicagomaroon.com/2012/05/25/the-economics-of-crime-with-gary-becker/.
– Benjamin Wallace-Wells, “Cass Sunstein Wants to Nudge Us,” https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/magazine/16Sunstein-t.html
– Additional reading:
o Heinzerling, Lisa. “Quality control: A reply to Professor Sunstein.” California Law Review (2014): 1457-1467. https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4267&context=californialawreview
o Lisa Heinzerling, “Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House,” Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 31 (2014): i.

Week 15 (Dec. 10): The economics profession: Why No Economist Accountability Act?
In this class, we will review competing definitions of economics and the role of economists in policymaking in the U.S., and its connection to government in comparison to other disciplines. How do economists engage in policy discourse across the political spectrum?
– Fourcade, Marion, Etienne Ollion, and Yann Algan. 2015. “The Superiority of Economists.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29 (1): 89-114. https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/jep.29.1.89
– Justin Wolfers, “Evidence of a Toxic Environment for Women in Economics,” The New York Times, August 18, 2017, sec. The Upshot, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/upshot/evidence-of-a-toxic-environment-for-women-in-economics.html.
– Additional reading:
o Amanda Bayer and Cecilia Elena Rouse, “Diversity in the Economics Profession: A New Attack on an Old Problem,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 30, no. 4 (November 2016): 221–42, https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.4.221.
o Dean Baker paper on economic accountability: http://cepr.net/documents/publications/ifi_2004_07.htm


Contemporary Trade Policy Issues
University of New Hampshire

The goal of this course is to develop a familiarity with several major aspects of contemporary debates around international trade policy. Rather than delving into methodological and measurement debates that would be common in a graduate economics course on trade, this study focuses instead on the legal and political issues with which a social or think-tank entrepreneur dealing with real-world trading and foreign policy should be acquainted.

The five reading units include:
1. What have been the major historical developments in U.S. post-war trade strategy? What are the primary functions of institutions the U.S. helped create?
2. How has India engaged in this architecture and developed its own trade strategy?
3. What have been the primary approaches decisionmakers at the GATT and WTO have used to regulate technical standards in products?
4. Based on the long-running GATT/WTO disputes on tuna, what policy space does the U.S. have to block imports of seafood from its trading partners? What defensive and offensive steps could a social entrepreneur take to secure U.S. market access in the face of possible regulatory objections?
5. How can trade policy be an opportunity or challenge for addressing climate change? How can a social entrepreneur make the affirmative case that their trading plans will help address global warming?


General Trade Architecture / U.S. Policy
1. Richard Toye, “Developing Multilateralism: The Havana Charter and the Fight for the International Trade Organization, 1947–1948,” The International History Review 25, no. 2 (2003): 282–305.
2. Gabrielle Marceau, ed., A History of Law and Lawyers in the GATT/WTO: The Development of the Rule of Law in the Multilateral Trading System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
3. I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics, Fourth Edition (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005).
4. Todd Tucker and Lori Wallach, The Rise and Fall of Fast Track Trade Authority (Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 2009).
5. Todd Tucker, “The Sustainable Equitable Trade Doctrine” (New York: Roosevelt Institute, March 16, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/trade-set-doctrine/.
6. William J. Drake and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: ‘Trade in Services’ and the Uruguay Round,” International Organization 46, no. 1 (January 1, 1992): 37–100, doi:10.2307/2706952.
7. Joost Pauwelyn, Optimal Protection of International Law: Navigating between European Absolutism and American Voluntarism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
8. Manfred Elsig, “Legalization in Context: The Design of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, no. 2 (May 1, 2017): 304–19, doi:10.1177/1369148117690890.
9. Simon J. Evenett and Michael Meier, “An Interim Assessment of the US Trade Policy of ‘Competitive Liberalization,’” The World Economy 31, no. 1 (2008): 31–66.
10. Thomas Cottier and Manfred Elsig, eds., Governing the World Trade Organization: Past, Present and Beyond Doha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
11. Kent Jones, Reconstructing the World Trade Organization for the 21st Century: An Institutional Approach (Oxford University Press, 2015).

India-U.S. Trade Relations and Market Access for Less Developed Countries
1. Joost Pauwelyn, “The End of Differential Treatment for Developing Countries? Lessons from the Trade and Climate Change Regimes,” Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 22, no. 1 (April 1, 2013): 29–41, doi:10.1111/reel.12017.
2. Manfred Elsig and Philipp Stucki, “Low-Income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why Wake up the Sleeping Dog?,” Review of International Political Economy 19, no. 2 (May 1, 2012): 292–316, doi:10.1080/09692290.2010.528313.
3. Carina van de Wetering, Changing US Foreign Policy toward India: US-India Relations since the Cold War, 1st ed. 2016 edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
4. Aaditya Mattoo and Robert Mitchell Stern, India and the WTO (World Bank Publications, 2003).
5. Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, “India and Bretton Woods II,” Economic and Political Weekly 43, no. 45 (2008): 62–70, doi:10.2307/40278753.
6. Kasturi Das, “Coping with SPS Challenges in India: WTO and Beyond,” Journal of International Economic Law 11, no. 4 (2008): 971–1019.
7. Amy A. Quark, “Ratcheting up Protective Regulations in the Shadow of the WTO: NGO Strategy and Food Safety Standard-Setting in India,” Review of International Political Economy 23, no. 5 (September 2, 2016): 872–98, doi:10.1080/09692290.2016.1242509.
8. Abhijit Das and James J. Nedumpara, eds., WTO Dispute Settlement at Twenty – Insiders’ Reflections on India’s Participation (Singapore: Springer, 2016), http://www.springer.com/us/book/9789811005985.
9. J. P. Singh and Surupa Gupta, “Agriculture and Its Discontents: Coalitional Politics at the WTO with Special Reference to India’s Food Security Interests,” International Negotiation 21, no. 2 (June 2, 2016): 295–326, doi:10.1163/15718069-12341334.
10. Parthapratim Pal, “Deal Breaker or the Protector of Interests of Developing Countries? India’s Negotiating Stance in WTO,” in International Trade and International Finance (Springer, New Delhi, 2016), 159–77, doi:10.1007/978-81-322-2797-7_8.
11. Caf Dowlah, “Cross-Border Labor Mobility: A Critical Assessment of WTO’s GATS Mode 4 Vis-à-Vis Regional Trade Agreements,” Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 13, no. 1 (March 11, 2014): 2–18, doi:10.1108/JITLP-12-2012-0020.
12. Marion Panizzon, “US—India Visa Fee Controversy before the WTO: A Migration-Mobility Nexus for the WTO?,” NCCR, October 27, 2016, http://blog.nccr-onthemove.ch/us-india-visa-fee-controversy-before-the-wto-a-migration-mobility-nexus-for-the-wto/.

Regulatory Standards
1. Petros C. Mavroidis, “Driftin’ Too Far from Shore – Why the Test for Compliance with the TBT Agreement Developed by the WTO Appellate Body Is Wrong, and What Should the AB Have Done Instead,” World Trade Review 12, no. 03 (July 2013): 509–531, doi:10.1017/S1474745613000013.
2. Todd Tucker, “The WTO Ruling on the United States’ Flavoured Cigarettes Ban,” in The Global Tobacco Epidemic and the Law, ed. Tania S. Voon and Andrew D. Mitchell (London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), 87–104.
3. Maggie Xiaoyang Chen and Aaditya Mattoo, “Regionalism in Standards: Good or Bad for Trade?,” The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d’Economique 41, no. 3 (2008): 838–63, doi:10.2307/25478306.
4. Elizabeth Sheargold and Andrew D. Mitchell, “The TPP and Good Regulatory Practices: An Opportunity for Regulatory Coherence to Promote Regulatory Autonomy?,” World Trade Review 15, no. 4 (October 2016): 587–612, doi:10.1017/S1474745616000045.
5. Robert E. Hudec, “GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an” Aim and Effects” Test,” International Lawyer 32, no. 3 (1998): 619–649.
6. Robert Howse and Donald Regan, “The Product/Process Distinction-an Illusory Basis for Disciplining’unilateralism’in Trade Policy,” European Journal of International Law 11, no. 2 (2000): 249–289.

Case Study: Lessons from Tuna Wars
1. Andras Szepesi, Rudolf Ramsauer, and Elbio Rosselli, U.S. – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Report of the Panel), No. DS21/R-39S/155 (GATT September 3, 1991).
2. Mario Matus, Franz Perrez, and Elizabeth Chelliah, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Distribution of Tuna and Tuna Products (Report of the Panel), No. WT/DS381/R (WTO 2011).
3. Yuejiao Zhang, Ujal Singh Bhatia, and Thomas R. Graham, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Distribution of Tuna and Tuna Products (Report of the Appellate Body), No. WT/DS381/AB/R (WTO 2012).
4. Mario Matus, Elizabeth Chelliah, and Franz Perrez, United States – Measures Concerning The Importation, Marketing And Sale Of Tuna And Tuna Products (Recourse To Article 21.5 Of The DSU By Mexico, Report Of The Panel), No. WT/DS381/RW (January 30, 2015).
5. Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing, Ujal Singh Bhatia, and Yuejiao Zhang, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (“Tuna II”) (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, Report of the Appellate Body), No. WT/DS381/AB/RW (WTO November 20, 2015).
6. Stefán Haukur Jóhannesson, Elizabeth Chelliah, and Franz Perrez, United States – Measures Concerning The Importation, Marketing And Sale Of Tuna And Tuna Products (Recourse to article 22.6 of the DSU by the United States, Decision by the Arbitrator), No. WT/DS381/ARB (April 25, 2017).

Case Study: Trade-Climate Connections
1. Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change,” Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 01 (March 2011): 7–23, doi:10.1017/S1537592710004068.
2. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Steve Charnovitz, and Jisun Kim, Global Warming and the World Trading System (Peterson Institute, 2009).
3. Rachel Brewster, “Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change Legislation,” Yale Law & Policy Review 28, no. 2 (2010): 245–312, doi:10.2307/27871296.
4. Todd Tucker, “Trade Pacts Threaten Effective Use of Clean Air Act to Regulate Greenhouse Gases” (Washington, DC: Public Citizen, July 20, 2012), http://www.citizen.org/documents/clean-air-act-and-trade-paper-final.pdf.
5. Jakob Skovgaard, “The Devil Lies in the Definition: Competing Approaches to Fossil Fuel Subsidies at the IMF and the OECD,” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 17, no. 3 (June 1, 2017): 341–53, doi:10.1007/s10784-017-9355-z.
6. David Walker, Pornchai Danvivathana, and Marco Tulio Molina Tejeda, India – Certain Measures relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (Report of the Panel), No. WT/DS456/R (WTO February 24, 2016).
7. Peter Van den Bossche, Seung Wha Chang, and Thomas R. Graham, India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (Report of the Appellate Body), No. WT/DS456/AB/R (WTO September 16, 2016).
8. D. Ravi Kanth, “India Complains against US at WTO over Subsidies,” LiveMint, February 7, 2017, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/pJMmeKKNEykdzXMzi2OgAO/India-complains-against-US-at-WTO-over-subsidies.html.