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TransCanada is suing the US over #KeystoneXL. The US might lose.

I have a piece in the Washington Post’s MonkeyCage today. Here is the lede:

On Jan. 6, TransCanada went to court to claim that the Obama administration’s failure to approve the Keystone XL pipeline violates U.S. obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA. The company is asking for $15 billion in compensation from U.S. taxpayers.

This mixes two challenges confronting President Obama and Democratic politicians in recent years. Environmentalists have turned the ecologically questionable tar sands pipeline into a no-fly-zone in domestic politics. Meanwhile, labor and other groups have made opposition to NAFTA-style deals essential for their electoral support. In the face of this pressure from the left, even one-time advocates of both the pipeline and trade deals like Hillary Clinton have reversed course on both.

The U.S. has never lost an ISDS lawsuit. Keystone might break the winning streak. 

To read the full piece, head over to the WaPo website.

Called it

Yesterday, TransCanada launched a NAFTA claim against the US. Four years ago, I called it.

I’m pretty sure that I am the first person to suggest that the Keystone XL issue was a good candidate for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Dateline: 1/19/2012.

As I’m thumbing through the company’s legal filings, I’m even more convinced that the claim has legal merit. Here’s some things you never want to do if you want to avoid a legal claim in general, let alone an ISDS claim:

  • Say that your decision-making was motivated by politics, as Obama did in his official statement announcing rejection of the Keystone XL decision.
  • Allow an approval process for a foreign investor to drag on five times longer than the average wait time.
  • Make a decision that runs against your all of your own on-the-record scientific assessments.
  • Grant permits to carry the same product from the same place during the same period you are stalling the permit consideration in question.
  • Approve other cross-border pipeline applications by US investors and investors of third countries.
  • Allow domestic production of oil sands.
  • Suggest that only proposed pipelines with enough already sunk costs will be considered, and then go back on that word.
  • Help the company manage its political and legal relationships with subfederal officials.
  • Signal at the highest level (Sec. Clinton) a predisposition to approve something that has not gone through standard regulatory process.
  • Suggest – as Obama did – that decision will only be motivated by carbon emission considerations, before then moving goal post and evaluation metrics to more diffuse “national interest”.
  • Make excuses for delays that lack credibility.
  • Add layers to review not strictly required by law.
  • Allow lots of variance in between what you (White House) say and subfederal officials say, what you say and Congress says, or what you  and your agencies say.
  • In sum, don’t allow an investor to develop anything like “reasonable expectations” of things going their way, if things aren’t going to go their way.

I may be mis-characterizing some parts of the claim or underlying issues – let me know if I am. But from a quick read, it seems like these are the grievances as TransCanada perceives them.

Whether it’s reasonable to expect states to navigate politically tricky waters in pristine ways is a broader question – one I’ll address in future posts. But as a legal matter, the US behavior seems to clearly implicate issues under NAFTA’s provisions on national treatment, most-favored nation treatment, and fair and equitable treatment. (The expropriation claim – TransCanada’s fourth – seems weakest.)

From FOIA materials I’ve gotten over the years, I know that USTR weighs in on the NAFTA/WTO compatibility of proposed regulations. I find it impossible to believe that they did not do so with the Keystone case over 2008-2015, especially since prominent legal blogs raised the issue consistently after I first did. The above ham-fisted moves suggest that USTR’s advice was not being followed, that it wasn’t solicited/offered (unlikely), or that the political cover of an adverse legal ruling might have been desirable. This last scenario effectively passes the buck for a politically tough decision to unelected adjudicators.

One can imagine a different path. Obama could have stopped the process much earlier, and not sent mixed signals to the pipeline operator. That would have been a better protection, although not airtight. After all, consistency in policy-making is a near article-of-faith in the arbitration community, and the Bush administration had already put out a favorable tone it its relation to the Keystone issue. Obama might have paid a price for reversal, no matter how early.

I’ll have more to say about the politics of this latest TransCanada move in future posts.

After WTO case, Congress repeals beef labels

Last week, Congress passed the $1.1 trillion Omnibus Bill to keep the government running. And do lots of other stuff, as Tessa Berenson’s listicle reports.

 

Buried in this massive legislation was Section 759, which reads like a nothing burger:

 

(a) Section 281 of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 (7 U.S.C. 1638) is amended— (1)by striking paragraphs (1) and (7); (2) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), and (9) as paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7), respectively; and (3) in paragraph (1)(A) (as so redesignated)— (A) in clause (i), by striking beef, and , pork,; and (B) in clause (ii), by striking ground beef, and , ground pork,.
(b) Section 282 of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 (7 U.S.C. 1638a) is amended— (1) in subsection (a)(2)— (A) in the heading, by striking beef, and pork,; (B) by striking beef, and pork, each place it appears in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D); and (C) in subparagraph (E)— (i) in the heading, by striking beef, pork,; and (ii) by striking ground beef, ground pork, each place it appears; and (2) in subsection (f)(2)— (A) by striking subparagraphs (B) and (C); and (B) by redesignating subparagraphs (D) and (E) as subparagraphs (B) and (C), respectively
Unless you are an agribusiness lobbyist, you wouldn’t realize that this language repeals country of origin labels for meats.

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This congressional action is noteworthy, for a few reasons.
It suggests a congressional realignment on food regulation. In the oughts, consumers were increasingly grossed out by meat production in the fast food industry. Eric Schlosser wrote an expose on the practices (Fast Food Nation), which later became a movie. I can’t unread this phrase from the book:
The days when hamburger meat was ground in the back of a butcher shop, out of scraps from one or two sides of beef, are long gone. Like the multiple sex partners that helped spread the AIDS epidemic, the huge admixture of animals in most American ground beef plants has played a crucial role in spreading E. coli 0157:H7. A single fast food hamburger now contains meat from dozens or even hundreds of different cattle.
By 2008, one of the prices a Democratic Congress put on a new Farm Bill was for the Bush administration to approve more transparent labeling for the origin of beef. It was left for the Obama administration to actually write the rule for so-called country of origin labeling (COOL), which it did soon after taking office. Fast forward to 2015, and a Republican controlled Congress stealthily repeals that accomplishment, with an assist from Obama.
Moreover, international law cast a shadow on the whole process. Even before the Bush administration left office, Canada and Mexico were threatening to challenge COOL at the World Trade Organization (WTO). They claimed the whole scheme violated trading rules, and in 2012, the group’s appellate body sided with them… in part. Ujal Singh Bhatia of India, Ricardo Ramirez Hernandez of Mexico, and Peter Van den Bossche of Belgium – the adjudicators assigned to the case – found that the US labels placed a burden on the use of Mexican and Canadian beef and pork cuts. But they found that the two countries overreached in their arguments on ground beef and pork. (For an extensive analysis of some of the quirkier aspects of their decision, see this piece I wrote at the time.  For the legal decisions themselves, see the WTO website.) The US made some changes to COOL in an effort to comply with the WTO decision. Ultimately, further groups of adjudicators ruled against these efforts as well. And earlier this month, the WTO authorized over $1 billion in
sanctions against the US.
The case upset the emerging narrative about North American harmony. Wunderkid Justin Trudeau has being lauded for lessening Canadian tensions with the US, and gushing over his admiration for Obama. But in one of her first acts in office, Trudeau’s trade minister (and former journalist) Chrystia Freeland was threatening a trade war with the US over COOL.
It also shows the limits of the social science concepts we use to understand the intersection between domestic and international law. There has long been a worry that global trading rules could make for a “regulatory chill” on domestic regulation. In this story, international legal rulings (or the threat thereof) are a neoliberal superstructure that have a chilling effect on more interventionist public interest regulations.
Scholars have found scarce evidence of regulatory chill, and have even argued for a “California effect”, whereby countries race to the top (not the bottom) in an effort to build an eco-friendly brand.
This WTO case is neither chilling effect or California effect. Indeed, congressional leaders cited the WTO loss as the reason for repealing COOL. Yet they went further than the ruling actually required, repealing the labels for ground beef and pork as well. As the pro-COOL National Farmers Union said last week:

The language to repeal most significant components of COOL is contained as a rider in the 2016 Appropriations Act. Johnson noted that the language goes well beyond the WTO dispute, repealing COOL for ground beef and pork – two products that were explicitly found to be trade compliant.

“Clearly this language was produced by long-time COOL opponents who legislated in the dark of the night under the guise of solving an issue, when really their intentions completely undermine the will of American consumers and producers,” said Johnson. “NFU is furious that yet again the dysfunction of Congress has enabled this to happen.”

 

I call this a chilling inflect. It occurs when domestic political actors weaken their own laws – rhetorically making use of international legal orders, but going beyond them to chart their own additional deregulatory course.

Australia Beats Philip Morris

In the most high-profile investment dispute in recent history, Australia has emerged victorious. The challenge was brought by tobacco company Philip Morris against public health regulations.

According to Investment Arbitration Reporter, the three arbitrators appointed to hear the case dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Australia asked the tribunal to block the dispute from going forward, as the US company appeared to be opportunistically gaming the system by claiming a Hong Kong nationality.

A few takeaways.

The case may be a fleeting first attempt to crack down on the creeping multilateralist nature of the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system – where companies can claim to be from anywhere and benefit from any treaty in the 3,200-strong investment treaty network. In other words, arbitrators may demand that a company be from where it says it is from.

It also shows that arbitrators are not political masochists. John Oliver dedicated a show to ridiculing the claim and stoking public outrage. This effort (and others) was so successful that tobacco got carved out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership deal.

Were three arbitrators really going to risk further roll back of the system (and future paydays)? This is a case of the system watching out for itself. To hand Big Tobacco a victory – after the Australian Supreme Court had already ruled against the industry – would have invited substantial overhaul of ISDS.

Ironically, critics’ success makes their work harder. Every time anti-ISDS activists have made a poster child out of a threatening case before it was decided (Loewen, Pac Rim), arbitrators ended up ruling against the investor.* These state victories make the system appear less objectionable. The case may help the TPP, at least at the margin.

At the same time, the Australia ruling has downsides for ISDS advocates. If businesses perceive that arbitrators have a weak spine in the face of political pressure, then they will be less likely to go to the considerable expense of launching ISDS claims. It will also make it harder for them to credibly make threats to sue other states over tobacco policy.

+++

*Pac Rim launched a case under CAFTA and a Salvadoran law. The CAFTA part of the claim was dismissed, and I would be surprised if the other part were not also.

Power to punt

Earlier this week, the Supreme Court issued another landmark arbitration decision in DirectTV v. Imburgia. The case pitted one of America’s least loved companies against two of its former subscribers, who complained about the company’s obnoxious early termination fees.

The key facts:

  • As a New York Times series recently reported, major companies have become very aggressive and rather slippery about closing off consumers’ access to class actions in favor of arbitration. Arbitration is seen as more favorable to companies, as they appoint and frequently re-hire the arbitrators.
  • In 2005, the California Supreme Court indicated that it wouldn’t enforce certain arbitration agreements, finding them “unconscionable”.
  • Amy Imburgia brought a case against DirectTV in 2008 over the fees. Although the TV company generally requires arbitration, its customer contract at the time indicated that this arrangement could be overridden by the “law of your state”. Since this was true in California at the time, DirectTV did not push Imburgia into arbitration.
  • Fast forward a few years. In 2011, Justice Scalia announced for the Supreme Court in AT&T v. Concepcion overrode the 2005 California decision. He argued that California law – which allowed for consumers to band together in “class arbitrations” – made arbitration too expensive. Scalia argued that this defeated the purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, which created a judicial deference to arbitrators: “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”
  • In 2014, California courts ruled in Imburgia’s favor, arguing that the state law at the time favored them. They took note of the 2011 decision, but found that there was ambiguity in DirectTV’s contract, and that this should count against the company (since arbitration was such an exceptional mechanism).
  • Earlier this week, the US Supreme Court overruled them. The court decision split the liberal bench. In AT&T v. Concepcion, Justice Breyer penned a pro-consumer dissent signed onto by his three liberal colleagues. In DirectTV, Breyer flipped to the other side – writing the majority decision with the conservatives and Justice Kagan. Justice Ginsburg wrote a sharply worded dissent (co-signed by Sotomayor), calling out Breyer for his inconsistencies.

There’s a few things I take from this case.

First, arbitration is not “privatized justice”. Get three arbitrators together in a room (whether for DirectTV or Chevron), and the only reason their decision matters is because a public court will back it up. What these arbitration cases are about is the precise division of labor between private and public courts, and between federal and state courts. The federal government will override a state court that allows “class arbitration” or blocks standard (non-class) arbitration. Private arbitrators will determine the merits of disputes between consumers, and state and federal courts will back them up.

Continue reading “Power to punt”

#TPP Text in a Single PDF

Were you excited when the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) text was released last month, but bummed that it came in 31 separate PDFs?

For your CTRL-F’ing pleasure, please find all 30 chapters (plus the preamble): TPP Full Text All Chapters in a single PDF document.

There are a great many country-specific add-on documents. For the TPP annexes on non-conforming measures for investment, services, financial services, and state-owned enterprises, click here for the TPP NCMs full text PDF.

If anyone wants to compile the country-specific documents for Chapters 2 (tariffs), 3 (rules of origin), 4 (textiles and apparel), 12 (temporary entry of business people), 15 (government procurement), or 19 (labor), I am happy to link to them. Just ping me. The tariff schedules in particular are massive, so I don’t want them eating up my storage space.

Dolphins!!!

The WTO ruled against dolphin-safe labels for the fourth time today. The ruling continues a growing trend of WTO Appellate Body willingness to scrutinize even the most microscopic aspects of national regulatory methods.

A bit of background. In the Eastern Tropical Pacific, tuna swim with dolphins. Tuna fishers know this, so they chase, encircle and throw purse-seine nets on dolphins (who are easy to spot) to get the tuna (who are not). Needless to say, this process hurts and often maims dolphins.

The US had responded to this phenomenon in a number of ways.

  • First, facing pressure from environmentalists and animal rights advocates in the early 1990s, the US banned dolphin-unsafe tuna. Mexico (where purse seine methods are common) complained to the GATT (a pre-WTO dispute settlement body) that the measure violated US obligations. The GATT body agreed.
  • During the Clinton years, the US went for lighter touch regulation, and gave consumers the power to “vote with their dollars”. Labels were introduced to inform consumers about whether their tuna was “Dolphin-safe”. It was not and is not a mandatory regime: tuna canners can decide to apply for the label or not; consumers can buy tuna with the label or not. Ecuador and other nations’ tuna fisheries shifted to more humane tuna fishing practices to get the label, but Mexican industry did not.
  • The Clinton and Bush administration then tried to go even lighter touch, arguing that Mexican tuna should get the label, even if tuna is caught with purse-seine nets. Environmentalists fought this watering down, and got a US court to agree in a 2007 ruling.
  • Shortly thereafter, Mexico launched a WTO case against the US, asking for the labels and court ruling to be set aside. The case has lasted seven years. A lower panel ruled with Mexico against the US in 2011, and the Appellate Body came to the same conclusion (albeit on different legal grounds) in 2012. The US made several changes to its labeling regime in an effort to comply. Mexico was still not satisfied, so requested a WTO compliance  panel. This panel sided with Mexico in April of this year, and the Appellate Body backed it up today.

At a superficial level, the WTO’s approach in these cases is a boon to animal rights. They didn’t fault the US for wanting to reduce dolphin mortality. Instead, they ruled that the WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade agreement (TBT) requires consideration of both trade promotion and regulatory objectives.

One way to read the Appellate Body decisions is the following: if the US is going to clamp down on harmful fishing methods (and thereby restrict trade), it needs to go whole hog. Ban the same methods everywhere, ban the same injury everywhere, enforce the same standard everywhere in the same way with the same resources. Again, this has a surface appeal. Equality before the law, protect Flipper around the globe, etc.

But there’s one catch. Tuna and dolphin don’t swim together elsewhere outside of the Eastern Tropical Pacific, and (therefore) purse-seine nets aren’t economical.

Consequently, it is not economical for the US to require fishing inspectors to check for these things outside of the Pacific region. So the US applies slightly lighter touch regulation to other fisheries. Namely,

  • Scenario 1: Tuna vessels in the Eastern Pacific need the captain and an observer to both certify that there (1) was no purse-seine nets used and (2) no dolphin injury.
  • Scenario 2: Captains of tuna fishing vessels in other regions that sometimes use purse-seine nets must certify both things.
  • Scenario 3: Captains of vessels that don’t use nets and aren’t in the region must only certify that no dolphins were injured.
  • However, the US can require an observer in scenarios 2 and 3 if there is evidence of harm to dolphins that needs to be addressed. Also, there are slightly different verification and record-keeping requirements for the different scenarios.

The Appellate Body faulted the US on these distinctions, insisting that one standard was needed to avoid a discrimination finding.* Indeed, while the April panel only faulted for the US for its certification and verification practices, today’s ruling flipped that and said that the eligibility distinctions per se were discriminatory (para. 7.230, 7.238).

Continue reading “Dolphins!!!”

Creeping multilateralism and #TPP

The investment treaty regime is mostly bilateral, but with creeping multilateralist tendencies. What I mean by that, as I explained in this WaPo piece, is that investors (and ultimately arbitrators) can pull from a wide range of different obligations between Country A and Country B, even if they are from neither. This is due to most-favored nation rules (or MFN, which require a host state to accord an investor of a given country the BEST treatment they accord investors of any country) and lax definitions of “investor” (which can extend to entities from any country, so long as they incorporate in a country with ISDS treaty protections).

Creeping multilateralism is different than real multilateralism. Unlike true multilateral pacts like the WTO, the 3,200 investment treaties are not a single undertaking that (at least in theory) constitutes a thought-through tapestry that balances between members, sectors and obligations. Instead, it is an ad hoc multilateralism, where the protections an investor can claim for themselves vary in proportion to their wiliness and legal ingenuity.

The final TPP text closes some options for creeping multilateralism, and opens others. Warning: this is pretty wonky, even by this blog’s standards.
Continue reading “Creeping multilateralism and #TPP”

What is “Arbitration”?

The New York Times had a major investigative series last week exposing companies’ extensive use of arbitration clauses to keep disputes out of court.

The journalists Michael Corkery, Robert Gebeloff and Jessica Silver-Greenberg have done a major service showing how churches force their parishioners and employees to use “Christian” arbitration, how doctors and hospitals use their own procedures for disputes with patients and staff, and financial services firms require arbitration for conflicts with customers.

In the wake of the series, friends and family that have long struggled to understand my research on investor-state dispute settlement arbitration (or ISDS) have told me they “get it now”.

But there is no single definition of arbitration, or of what separates it from normal courts. In Marty Shapiro’s (1986) classic typology, arbitrators differ from judges in that the former are un-tenured, chosen by the disputing parties, and pick and impose a solution that is only binding on those same parties. In contrast, judges are tenured and empowered by sovereigns to settle disputes through the making of legal decisions that often set rules also for non-disputants. Lower down on Shapiro’s sliding scale of “triadic conflict resolvers” are “go-betweens” (which transmit messages between disputing parties), and “mediators” (who find a middle solution between the parties’ positions).

But no sooner is this typology than it becomes complicated. Shapiro notes that a lot of what judges do is mediation: forcing parties to take their dispute out of courts. Moreover, when judges are hearing cases where the state is a defendant or prosecutor, the “triad” threatens to collapse into two, as the judge is a part of the state. Barbara Koremenos, while hewing to Shapiro’s typology fairly closely, notes that international arbitrators and international judges aren’t that different – both rely on some national authority to enforce their decisions. Meanwhile, both domestically and internationally, Erik Voeten notes that judges may lack sufficient competence, independence or legitimacy to play their ideal type role.

Just as judges slide away from their ideal type role, arbitrators can often come quite close to judges’ role. In my own work, I have argued that investment arbitrators do many of the things more often associated with judges. Namely, they demonstrate substantial independence (despite lacking tenure). They make law-like pronouncements, and write public-facing written decisions that become highly influential.

In the end, much depends on the rules in a particular adjudication forum. For instance, another emerging type of international arbitration is tax arbitration. This dispute settlement mechanism is triggered when two countries lay claim to the same bit of revenue by a multinational company or taxpayer. Say both the US and Canada want to tax the same bit of income by Budweiser. Under new arbitration rules, the countries could go to arbitration. But unlike investor-state dispute settlement, tax arbitration does not produce written awards. Indeed, all the arbitrators do is pick which proposal (US or Canadian) will prevail. This methodology is called baseball arbitration, after its roots in disputes between labor and management in US baseball. Compared with the relative autonomy of ISDS, tax arbitration seems to be much closer to what Eric Posner and John Yoo call state-dependent international tribunals.

So what, if anything, is the common denominator tying different forms of arbitration together?

I prefer a more limited two-pronged definition. First, arbitration is dispute settlement by un-tenured deciders, who are appointed on a case by case basis.

Second, arbitration requires the collaboration of domestic courts. While the NYT called domestic arbitration the “privatization of justice”, I don’t see it that way. In their own reporting, arbitral decisions were only made effective because courts deferred to and enforced them. Likewise, ISDS decisions only matter because domestic courts help enforce them. Much of this enforcement obligation comes in the same federal statute – the Federal Arbitration Act, which is yet another point of commonality.

On this second prong, arbitration is not a world apart from domestic courts, who also don’t have their own police force and require executive branches to help enforce their decisions. As President Andrew Jackson once said of the Supreme Court chief justice, “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!” But arbitration requires the additional first step of domestic court enforcement.

And standing over both arbitration and judging, I prefer the umbrella term “adjudication”. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “to adjudge” as “to pronounce or decree by judicial sentence or by a similar legal or official ruling”. Many of the examples in the etymology include cases from mixed arbitral commissions – suggesting a common tie.

In the end, what the NYT series (and friends’ reactions to it) show is how attached Americans are to a specific vision of the domestic legal system. One would think that access to courts (and class action lawsuits) is the only way that underdogs can get justice. But there are other ways. As Robert Kagan argues, European democracies do a much better job at achieving through regulation what America attempts (badly) to achieve through litigation. But, as Kagan also notes,  with the serious political barriers that exist to getting comprehensive welfare protections in place, adversarial legalism may be all we have. In that context, it is not surprising that readers would be outraged by these shifts – by whatever name they go by.

Does #TPP Meet Hillary Clinton’s #ISDS Standards?

In 2002, Hillary Clinton laid out a marker for what good investment protections would like. The vehicle for this proposal was a suggested amendment to the Republican fast track trade legislation.

How well does the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) final text match up?

As it turns out, the TPP falls short of some of the protections Clinton prescribed for both investors and states. It also presents different procedural provisions than what Clinton had in mind.

On the investor side, Clinton called for eliminations of exceptions to national treatment, free capital transfers and performance requirements rules. The TPP largely maintains the exceptions of past trade pacts, and even builds some new ones into place.

On the state side, Clinton called for new pacts to align international investor rights with the US Constitution, and its due process and takings provisions. U.S. nationals do not get to sue the U.S. government outside of U.S. courts (and there are limitations on when it may do so domestically – rarely for cash compensation), although TPP investors will be able to do so. U.S. citizens do not get to appeal a U.S. Supreme Court decision, although a SCOTUS ruling could be the subject of an investment arbitration claim under the TPP. All investment disputes involve the former, and many have involved the latter. The TPP does not change that. Investment tribunals have used broader expropriation and fair-and-equitable treatment standards than those contained in U.S. takings and due process jurisprudence. U.S. takings, regulatory takings and due process doctrine evolves over time, and the TPP does not require that its rules be aligned with U.S. standards in the present or future.

Finally, as for procedure, Clinton called for broad home state state authority to block claims by its own investors against other countries. The TPP includes no such broad requirement. In contrast, in financial services, the home state has a say in some cases as to whether the host state can invoke a prudential defense (Article 11.22.2), whether the TPP should trump a host state’s tax treaties (Article 29.4.4), and whether a host state’s taxation measures constitute an expropriation (Article 29.4.8).

Clinton’s meatiest procedural recommendation – the creation of an appellate body – is not included in the TPP (Article 9.22.11). Also contra her recommendations, there are no changes to upgrade the “efficiency” of arbitral selection, or mechanism for host state governments to get input from affected domestic parties (although this may exist under TPP countries’ domestic law).

Finally, Clinton made several calls for improvements to the transparency of ISDS proceedings. The TPP will require that respondent governments promptly make most major documents public,which actually exceeds her recommendations that only requests for dispute settlement be made public. However, this requirement does not seem to be backed up with any mechanism to ensure that governments do so (Article 9.23.1). There are various restrictions on respondents’ disclosing of confidential information. The TPP does not explicitly require that “all” hearings be open to the public (as Clinton recommended), only that some of its hearings be open (Article 9.23.2). Finally, unlike Clinton’s recommendation that tribunals allow non-disputing parties to make submissions, it will be up to each TPP tribunal whether they accept amicus briefs – and these are subject to various requirements of pertinence (Article 9.22.3 – Article 9.23).

For a full side-by-side comparison of Clinton’s 2002 recommendations to the TPP, see this memo: Pro-state and pro-investor changes in TPP. It updates the one I put out last week comparing the TPP to various preceding documents.